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Abstract 
 
It is striking how often countries with oil or other natural resource wealth 
have failed to grow more rapidly than those without.  This is the phenomenon 
known as the Natural Resource Curse. The principle is not confined to individual 
anecdotes or case studies, but has been borne out in econometric tests of the 
determinants of economic performance across a comprehensive sample of 
countries.  The paper considers six aspects of commodity wealth, each of interest 
in its own right, but each also a channel that some have suggested could lead to 
sub-standard economic performance.  They are: long-term trends in world 
commodity prices, volatility, crowding out of manufacturing, civil war, poor 
institutions, and the Dutch Disease.   The paper concludes with a consideration of 
promising ideas for institutions that could help a country that is rich in, say, oil 
overcome the pitfalls of the Curse and achieve good economic performance.    
They include indexation of oil contracts, hedging of export proceeds, 
denomination of debt in terms of oil, Chile-style fiscal rules, a monetary target that 
emphasizes product prices, transparent commodity funds, and lump-sum 
distribution. Outline 
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  2The Resource Curse: Introduction   
 
  It has been observed for some decades that the possession of oil, natural gas, or 
other valuable mineral deposits or natural resources does not necessarily confer economic 
growth.   Many African countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and the Congo are rich 
in oil, diamonds, or other minerals, and yet their peoples continue to experience low per 
capita income and low quality of life.   Meanwhile, the East Asian economies Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong have achieved western-level standards of 
living despite being rocky islands (or peninsulas) with virtually no exportable natural 
resources. Auty (2001) is apparently the one who coined the phrase “natural resource 
curse” to describe this puzzling phenomenon.  Its use spread rapidly.
1    
 
Figure 1, reproduced from Manzano and Rigobon (2001), illustrates for a cross 
section of countries.  Exports of primary products as a fraction of GDP appear on the 
horizontal axis and economic growth on the vertical axis.  The relationship on average is 
slightly negative.   The negative correlation is not very strong, masking almost as many 
resource successes as failures.    But it certainly suggests no positive correlation between 
natural resource wealth and economic growth. 
 
Source: Manzano and Rigobon (2001) 
 
                                                 
1 Prominent books include Collier (2007) and Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007).   
  3  How could abundance of hydrocarbon deposits, or other mineral and agricultural 
products, be a curse?   What would be the mechanism for this counter-intuitive 
relationship?   Broadly speaking, there are at least six lines of argument.  Fir
such commodities could be subject to secular decline on world markets.   Second, na
resources could be dead-end sectors in another sense:   they may crowd o
manufacturing, and the latter sector might be the one to offer dynamic benefits and 
spillovers that are good for growth.  (It does not sound implausible that 
“industrialization” could be the essence of economic development.)   Third, the volatili
of  world prices of energy and other mineral and agricultural commodities, which is
known to be especially high, could be problematic.   Fourth, countries where physical 
command of oil deposits or other resources by the government or a hereditary elite 
automatically confers wealth on the holders may be less likely to develop the institution
such as rule of law and decentralization of decision-making, that are conducive to 
economic development than in countries where moderate taxation of a thriving market 
economy is the only way to finance the government.  Fifth – such countries could ha
proclivity for armed conflict, which is inimical to economic growth.  Sixth – swings in 
commodity price
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t have afflicted other mineral producers in the past, and to find the path of 
success.   The last section of the paper explores some of the institutional innovations that 
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  The conclusion will not be that oil wealth need necessarily lead to inferior 
economic or political development, through any of these channels.   Rather, it is best 
view oil abundance as a double-edged sword, with both benefits and dangers.  It can
used for ill as easily as for good.  That mineral wealth does not in itself confer good 
economic performance is a striking enough phenomenon, without exaggerating the 
negative effects.   The priority for any country should be on identifying ways to avoid the 
pitfalls tha
can help.  
 
I.  Long-term trends in world commodity prices 
a.  The determination of the export price on world markets 
 
  Large countries have some control over the price at which they can sell 
exports on world markets, especially if the exports are manufactured goods or services.   
Developing countries, by contrast, tend to be smaller economically than major 
industrialized countries, and more likely to specialize in the exports of basic commodities
like oil.  As a result, they are more likely to fit the small open economy model:  they ca
be regarded as price-takers, not just for their import goods, but for their export goods as 
well.  That is, the prices of their tradable goods are generally taken as given on world
markets.  The price-taking assumption requires three conditions: low monopoly pow
low trade barriers, and intrinsic perfect substitutability in the commodity as between 
domestic and foreign producers – a condition usually met by primary products (and 
usually not met by manufactured goods and services).   To be literal, not every bar
  4Saudi Arabia does not satisfy the third condition, due to its large size in world oil 
markets.
2    But the assumption that most oil producers are price-takers holds relatively 
well.    
 
An upward revaluation of the currency should push down the price 
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To a first approximation, then, the local price of oil is equal to the dollar price on 
world markets times the exchange rate.  It follows, for example, that a devaluation should
push up the price of oil quickly and in proportion (leaving aside pre-existing contracts or 
export restrictions).  
of oil in proportion. 
  Throughout this paper we assume that the domestic country must take the price o
the export commodity as given, in terms of foreign currency.  We begin by consider
the hypothesis that the given world price entails a long-term secular decline.    Th
su
b.  T
 
The hypothesis that the prices of mineral and agricultural products follow a 
downward trajectory in the long run, relative to the prices of manufactures and other 
products, is associated with the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch (1950), and what 
used to be called the “structuralist school.”   The theoretical reasoning was that world 
demand for primary products is inelastic with respect to world income.  That is, for every
one percent increase in income, the demand for raw materials increases by less than one 
percent.   Engel’s Law is the (older) proposition that households spen
come on food and other basic necessities as they get richer.    
This hypothesis, if true, would readily support the conclusion that specializing in 
natural resources was a “bad deal.”   Mere “hewers of wood and drawers of water” would
remain forever poor if they did not industrialize.   The policy implication that was d
by Prebisch and the structuralists was that developing countries should discou
international trade with tariff and non-tariff barriers, to allow their domestic 
manufacturing sector to develop behind protective walls, rather than exploiting their 
traditional comparative advantage in natural resources as the classic theories of free trade
would have it.   This “import substitution” policy was adopted in most of Latin America 
and much of the rest of the developing w
fa
c.  Hypotheses of rising tren
(M
 
There also exist persuasive theoretical arguments that we should expect prices of 
oil and other minerals to experience upward trends in the long run.  The arguments begin
with the assumption that we are talking about non-renewable resources, i.e., deposits in 
 
2  If OPEC functioned effectively as a true cartel, then it would possess even more 
monopoly power in the aggregate.    We assume here, however, that OPEC does not 
currently exercise much monopoly power beyond that of Saudi Arabia, because so many 
non-members now produce oil and because even OPEC members usually do not feel 
constrained to stay within assigned quotas.  
  5the earth’s crust that are fixed in total supply and are gradually being depleted.   Oil, like
other mineral
 
s, is non-perishable.  (The argument does not apply as well to agricultural 
produc
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ventories, then the trend in prices will be higher than the interest rate, by that 
amount.) 
 
ii.  Malthusianism and the “peak oil” hypothesis 
ts.)    
Let us add one more assumption: whoever currently has claim to the resource – a
oil company – can be confident that it will retain possession, unless it sells to someone 
else, who then has equally safe property rights.  This assumption excludes cases where 
warlords compete over physical possession of the resource.   It also excludes cases wh
private oil companies fear that their contracts might be abrogated or their possessions 
nationalized.    Under such exceptions, the current owner has a strong incentive to pump
the oil or extract the minerals quickly, because it might never benefit from whatever is 
left in the ground.    One explanation for the sharp rise in oil prices between 1973 and 
1979, for example, is that private Western oil companies over the preceding two decades 
had anticipated the possibility that newly assertive developing countries would eventually 
nationalize the oil reserves within their borders, and thus had kept prices low by pump
oil more quickly than they would
 
 
Let us begin, at the risk of some oversimplification, by assuming also that the 
fixed deposits of oil in the earth’s crust are all sufficiently accessible that the costs of 
exploration, development, and pumping are relatively small compared to the value of the 
oil.  Hotelling (1931) deduced from these assumptions the important theoretical pr
 price of oil in the long run should rise at a rate equal to the interest rate.   
The logic is as follows.   At every point in time the owner of the oil – whether
private oil company or state-owned -- chooses how much to pump and how much to 
leave in the ground.  Whatever is pumped can be sold at today’s price (this is the price-
taker assumption) and the proceeds invested in bank deposits or US Treasury bills wh
earn the current interest rate.   If the value of the oil in the ground is not expected to 
increase in the future, or not expected to increase at a sufficiently rapid rate, then t
owner has an incentive to extract more of it today, so that he earns interest on the 
proceeds.   As oil companies worldwide react in this way, they drive down the price of oil
today, below its perceived long-run level.   When the current price is below its perceive
long-run level people will expect that the price must rise in the future.   Only when 
expectation of future appreciation is sufficient to offset the interest rate will the oil 
market be in equilibrium.  That is, only then will oil companies be close to indiffe
between pumping at a faster rate and a slower rate.   To say that the oil prices are 
expected to increase at the interest rate does not mean that there won’t be large price 
fluctuations above and below the trend.  But the theory does imply that, averaging out 
short-term unexpected fluctuations, oil prices in the long term should rise at the interest 
rate.   (If there are constant costs of extraction and storage, then the trend in prices will be 
lower than the interest rate, by that amount;  if there is a constant convenience yield from
holding in
  6 
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d.  Evidence 
 
 
 will 
vary depending on specific measures, it is possible to generalize somewhat across 
                                                
The idea that natural resources are in fixed supply, and that as a result their price
must rise in the long run as reserves begin to run low, is much older than Hotelling.  It 
goes back to Thomas Malthus (1798) and the genesis of fears of environmental scarcity 
(albeit without the role of the interest rate).   Demand grows with population, supply 
fi hat could be clearer in economics than the prediction that price will rise? 
3   
  The complication is that supply is not fixed.  True, at any point in time there is a 
certain stock of oil reserves that have been discovered.  But the historical pattern has lon
been that, as that stock is depleted, new reserves are found.  When the price goes up, i
makes exploration and development profitable for deposits that are farther under the 
surface or are underwater or in other hard-to-reach locations.  Th
new technologies are developed for exploration and extraction. 
  Over the two centuries since Malthus, or the 70 years since Hotelling, new 
discoveries and new technologies have increased the supply of oil and other natural 
resources at a pace that ha
population and incomes. 
  Just because supply has always increased in the past does not necessarily mean 
that it will always do so in the future.    In 1956 Marion King Hubbert, an oil engineer, 
predicted that the flow supply of oil within the United States would peak in the late 1960
and then start to decline permanently.    The prediction was based on a model in which
the fraction of the country’s reserves that has been discovered rises through time, and 
data on the rates of discovery versus consumption are used to estimate the parameters in
the model.   Unlike myriad other pessimistic forecasts, this one came true on schedule, 
earning subsequent fame for its author.  The planet Earth is a much larger place than 
United States, but it too is finite.  A number of analysts have extrapolated Hubbert’s 
words and modeling approach to claim that the same pattern would follow for extraction 
of the world’s oil reserves.   Specifically, some of them claim the 2000-2008 run-up in oi
prices confirmed a predicted global “Hubbert’s Peak.”
4     It remains to be seen whether 
we are currently witnessing a peak in world oil pr
o
i.  Statistical time series studies   
  
With strong theoretical arguments on both sides, either for an upward trend or for a
downward trend, one must say that it is an empirical question.   Although specifics
 
3 Even though Malthusianism predicts rising prices for commodities and structuralism 
predicts falling prices, both Malthus and Prebisch supported protection against imports.  
The resolution of the paradox is that Malthus had in mind England, where the import 
would be grain, while Prebisch had in mind Argentina, where grain would be the export 
and manufactures would be the import. 
4  E.g., Deffeyes (2005). 
  7commodity prices.
5   Terms of trade for commodity producers had a slight upward trend 
from 1870 to World War I, downward in the inter-war period, upward in the 1970s, 
downward in the 1980s and 1990s, and upward in the first decade of the new century.    
What is the overall statistical trend in the long run?     Some authors find a slight 
upward trend, some a slight downward trend.
6  The answer seems to depend, more than 
anything else, on the date of the end of the sample.   Studies written after the commodity 
price increases of the 1970s found an upward trend, but those written after the 1980s 
found a downward trend, even when both kinds of studies went back to the early 20
th 
century.   No doubt, when studies using data through 2008 are completed some will again 
find a positive long run trend.    This phenomenon is less surprising than it sounds.    
When a real price undergoes large ten-year cycles around a trend, estimates of the trend 
are very sensitive to the precise time period studied.
7 
 
ii.  The wager of Paul Ehrlich against Julian Simon 
 
Paul Ehrlich is a biologist, respected among scientists but with a history of 
sensationalist doomsday predictions regarding population, the environment, and resource 
scarcity.  Julian Simon was a libertarian economist, frustrated by the failure of the public 
to hold Malthusians like Ehrlich accountable for the terrible track record of their 
predictions.  In 1980, Simon publicly bet Ehrlich $1000 that the prices of five minerals 
would decline between then and 1990.   (Simon let Ehrlich choose the 10-year span and 
the list of minerals: copper, tin, nickel, chromium and tungsten.)  Ehrlich’s logic was 
Malthusian:   because supplies were fixed while growth of populations and economies 
would raise demand, the resulting scarcity would continue to drive up prices.   He, like 
most observers, was undoubtedly mentally extrapolating into the indefinite future what 
had been a strong upward movement in commodity prices over the preceding decade.    
Simon’s logic, on the other hand, is called cornucopian.  Yes, the future would repeat the 
past.  The relevant pattern from the past was not the ten-year trend, however, but rather a 
century of cycles:  resource scarcity does indeed drive up prices, whereupon, supply, 
demand and, especially, technology respond with a lag, driving the prices back down.    
Simon was precisely right.   He won the bet handily:  not only did the real price of the 
basket of five minerals decline over the subsequent ten years, but every one of the five 
real prices also declined.  He was also, almost certainly, right about the reasons: in 
response to the high prices of 1980, new technologies came into use, buyers economized, 
and new producers entered the market.
8 
                                                 
5  Although prices do not always move together for oil, other minerals, and agricultural 
products, there is a high correlation. 
6 Cuddington (1992), Cuddington and Urzua (1989), Grilli and Yang (1988),   Hadass 
and Williamson (2003), Reinhart and Wickham (1994), Kellard and Wohar (2005) and  
Balagtas and Holt (2009). 
7   The same phenomenon is evident in real exchange rates, stock prices, and housing 
prices. 
8 Commodity prices are driven by a variety of factors, including macroeconomic 
variables such as monetary policy and the business cycle.    Very low US real interest 
rates boosted commodity prices toward the end of the 1970s, especially in dollar terms, 
  8 
The Ehrlic-versus-Simon bet carries fascinating implications, not just for 
Malthusians versus Cornucopians, environmentalists versus economists, extrapolationists 
versus contrarians, and futurologists versus historians. For present purposes, the main 
important point is slightly more limited.    Simple extrapolation of medium-term trends is 
foolish.   One must take a longer-term perspective.   The review of the statistical literature 
in the preceding sub-section illustrated the importance of examining as long a statistical 
time series as possible.    
However, one should seek to avoid falling prey to either of two reductionist 
arguments at the philosophical poles of Mathusianism and cornucopianism.   On the one 
hand, the fact that the supply of minerals in the earth’s crust is a finite number, does not 
in itself justify the apocalyptic conclusion that we must necessarily run out.  Malthusians 
do not pay enough attention to the tendency for technological progress to ride to the 
rescue.  On the other hand, the fact that the Malthusian forecast has repeatedly been 
proven false in the past does not in itself imply the Panglossian forecast that this will 
always happen in the future.
9  One must seek, rather, a broad perspective in which all 
relevant reasoning and evidence are brought to bear in the  balance. 
 
 
 
II.  Medium-term Volatility of Prices for Oil and Other 
Commodities 
 
Of course the price of oil does not follow a smooth path, whether upward or 
downward.   Rather it experiences large short- and medium-term swings around a longer-
term average.  The world market prices for oil and natural gas are more volatile than 
those for any other mineral and agricultural commodities.  (Copper and coffee are two 
runner-ups.)  The other mineral and agricultural commodity prices in turn are far more 
volatile than prices of most manufactured products or services. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and high US real interest rates drove them down in the 1980s, again especially in dollar 
terms.  In the years 2003-2009, low interest rates may again have been a source of high 
commodity prices.   (References by the author include Frankel, 1986, 2008a,b; Frankel 
and  Hardouvelis, 1985; Frankel and Rose, 2009; and "Real Interest Rates Cast a Shadow 
Over Oil," Financial Times, April 15, 2005.  Also Barsky and Summers, 1988, Part III.)   
Some, of course, believe that destabilizing speculators are to blame for price swings. 
9 In the last decade alone, black swan thinking of this sort (”because we have never 
personally observed this happen in the past, it won’t happen in the future“) led Americans 
to both the national security tragedy that began on September 11, 2001, and the economic 
crisis that began in the summer of 2007.    Only small minorities of experts, those who 
had a truly broad perspective, were able to recognize ahead of time the possibilities of a 
mass terrorist attack and a plunge in housing prices even though neither had happened in 
living memory. 
  9Some have suggested that it is precisely the volatility of natural resource prices, rather 
than the trend, that is bad for economic growth.
10    
 
a.  Low short-run elasticities 
 
It is not hard to understand why the market price of oil is volatile in the short run, 
or even the medium run.   As a result of low elasticities of supply and demand with 
respect to price, relatively small fluctuations in demand (due, for example, to weather) or 
in supply (due, for example, to disruptions) require a large change in price to re-
equilibrate supply and demand.  Demand elasticities are low in the short run largely 
because the capital stock at any point in time is designed physcially to operate with a 
particular ratio of energy to output.  Supply elasticities are also often low in the short run 
because it takes time to adjust output.    Inventories can cushion the short run impact of 
fluctuations, but they are limited in size.     There is a bit of scope to substitute across 
different fuels, even in the short run.  But this just means that the prices of oil, natural 
gas, and other fuels tend to experience their big medium-term swings together. 
  In the longer run, elasticities are far higher, both on the demand side and the 
supply side.   This dynamic was clearly at work in the oil price shocks of the 1970s – the 
quadrupling after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the doubling after the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, which elicited relatively little consumer conservation or new supply 
sources in the short run, but a lot of both after a few years had passed.   People started 
insulating their houses and driving more fuel-efficient cars, and oil deposits were 
discovered and developed in new countries.  This is a major reason why the real price of 
oil came back down in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In the medium term, oil may be subject to a cob-web cycle, due to the lags in 
response:     The initial market equilibrium is a high price; the high price cuts demand 
after a few years, which results in turn leads to a new low price, which raises demand 
with a lag, and so on.   In theory, if people have rational expectations, they should look 
ahead to the next price cycle before making long-term investments in housing or drilling.   
But the complete sequence of boom-bust-boom over the last 35 years does look 
suspiciously like a cobweb cycle. 
 
b.  Is volatility per se detrimental to economic performance? 
 
Gamblers aside, most people would rather have less economic volatility than 
more.   But is variablity necessarily harmful for long run growth?   Some studies and 
historical examples suggest that high volatility can accompany the rapid growth phase of 
a country’s development  (the United States before World War I).     
One likely possibility is that cyclical shifts of movable resources (labor and land) 
back and forth across sectors – mineral, agricultural, manufacturing, services – incur 
needless transaction costs.   Frictional unemployment of labor, incomplete utilization of 
the capital stock, and incomplete occupancy of housing are true deadweight costs, even if 
they are temporary.  Government policy-makers may not be better than individual 
                                                 
10 Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007), Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) and 
Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2007). 
  10economic agents at discerning whether a boom in the price for the export commodity is 
temporary or permanent.    But the government cannot completely ignore the issue of 
volatility, under the logic that the private market can deal with it.  When it comes to 
exchange rate policy or fiscal policy, governments must necessarily make judgments 
about the likely permanence of shocks.   Moreover, since commodities are inherently 
risky, a diversified country may indeed  be better off than one specialized in oil or a few 
other commodities, other things equal.   On the other hand, the private sector dislikes risk 
as much as the government does, and will take steps to mitigate it; thus one must think 
where the market failure lies before assuming that a policy of deliberate diversification is 
necessarily justified. 
  We will consider the implications of the medium-term boom-bust cycle further, 
under the heading of the Dutch Disease, and how to deal with short-term volatility 
further, under the heading of policy responses. 
 
III.  The Natural Resource Curse and Possible Channels 
 
The Natural Resource Curse is not confined to individual anecdotes or case 
studies, but has been borne out in some statistical tests of the determinants of economic 
performance across a comprehensive sample of countries.  Sachs and Warner (1995) 
kicked off the econometric literature, finding that economic dependence on oil and 
mineral is correlated with slow economic growth, controlling for other structural 
attributes of the country.  Sachs and Warner (2001) summarized and extended previous 
research showing evidence that countries with great natural resource wealth tend to grow 
more slowly than resource-poor countries. They say their result is not easily explained by 
other variables, or by alternative ways to measure resource abundance. Their paper 
claims that there is little direct evidence that omitted geographical or climate variables 
explain the curse, or that there is a bias in their estimates resulting from some other 
unobserved growth deterrent.  Other studies that find a negative effect of oil, in 
particular, on economic performance, include Ross (2001),  Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003), and Smith (2004).    
  The result is by no means universal, especially when one generalizes beyond oil.  
Norway is conspicuous as an oil-producer that is at the top of the international league 
tables for governance and economic performance.   As many have pointed out, Botswana 
and Congo are both abundant in diamonds; yet Botswana is the best performer in 
continental Africa in terms of democracy, stability, and rapid growth of income, while 
Congo is among the worst.
11  
Among the statistical studies, Delacroix (1977), Davis (1995), and Herb (2005) all 
find no evidence of the natural resource curse.    Most recently, Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009) find that oil wealth and mineral wealth have positive effects on income per capita, 
when controlling for a number of variables, particularly dummies for East Asia and Latin 
America.   In some cases, especially if the data do not go back to a time before oil was 
discovered, the reason different studies come to different results is that oil wealth may 
                                                 
11  Engelbert (2000), Sarraf and Jimanji (2001), and Iimi (2006) are among those noting 
Botswana’s conspicuous escape from the Resource Curse of its neighbors. 
  11raise the level of per capita income, while reducing or failing to raise the growth rate of 
income (or the end-of-sample level of income, if the equation conditions on initial 
income).
12 
It is not that countries with oil wealth will necessarily achieve worse performance 
than those without. Few would advise a country with oil or other natural resources that it 
would be better off destroying them or refraining from developing them.  Oil-rich 
countries can succeed.  The question is how to make best use of the resource. The goal is 
to be a Norway rather than a Nigeria.   The same point applies to other precious minerals:  
the goal is to be a Botswana rather than a Bolivia, a Chile rather than a Congo. 
 
  Let us return to a consideration of various channels whereby oil wealth could lead 
to poor performance.     Based on the statistical evidence, we have already largely 
rejected the hypothesis of a long-term negative trend in world prices, while accepting the 
hypothesis of high volatility.   But we have yet to spell out exactly how high price 
volatility might lead to slower economic growth.   In addition we have yet to consider in 
detail the hypotheses according to which oil wealth leads to poor institutions – including 
military conflict and authoritarianism – which in turn might lead to poor economic 
performance. 
 
a.  Is commodity specialization per se detrimental to growth? 
 
What are the possible negative externalities to specialization in natural resources, 
beyond volatility?  What are the positive externalities to diversification into 
manufacturing?     
 
Outside of classical economics, diversification out of primary commodities into 
manufacturing in most circles is considered self-evidently desirable.   Several false 
arguments have been made for it.   One is the Prebisch hypothesis of secularly declining 
commodity prices, which we judged to lack merit in Part I of this paper.   Another is the 
mistaken “cargo cult” inference, based on the observation that advanced countries have 
heavy industries like steel mills and auto plants, that these visible monuments are 
necessarily the route to economic development.   But one should not dismiss more valid 
considerations, just because less valid arguments for diversification into manufacturing 
are sometimes made. 
 
Is industrialization the sine qua non of economic development?  Is encouragement 
of manufacturing necessary to achieve high income?    Classical economic theory says 
“no:”  countries are best off producing whatever is their comparative advantage, whether 
that is natural resources or manufacturing.    In this 19
th century view, attempts by Brazil 
to industrialize were as foolish as it would have been for Great Britain to try to grow 
coffee and oranges in hothouses.    But the “structuralists” mentioned early in this chapter 
were never alone in their feeling that countries only get sustainably rich if they 
industrialize (oil-rich sheikdoms notwithstanding).  Nor were they ever alone in feeling 
that industrialization in turn requires an extra push from the government, often known as 
                                                 
12 See Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) and Alexeev and Conrad (2009). 
  12industrial policy  (at least for latecomers).  Matsuyama (1992) provided an influential 
model formalizing this intuition:   the manufacturing sector is characterized by learning 
by doing, while the primary sector (agriculture, in his paper) is not.   The implication is 
that deliberate policy-induced diversification out of primary products into manufacturing 
is justified, and that a permanent commodity boom that crowds out manufacturing can 
indeed be harmful. 
 
b.  Do mineral riches lead to wars?
13 
 
Domestic conflict is certainly bad for economic development, especially when 
violent.  Where a valuable resource such as oil or diamonds is there for the taking, rather 
than requiring substantial inputs of labor and capital investment, factions are more likely 
to fight over it.   Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Humphreys 
(2005) and Collier (2007, Chapter 2) all find that economic dependence on oil and 
mineral wealth is correlated with civil war.  Chronic conflict in such oil-rich countries as 
Angola and Sudan comes to mind.  
The conclusion is not unanimous: Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) argue that the 
conventional measure of resource
 dependence is endogenous with respect to conflict, and 
that
 instrumenting for dependence eliminates its significance
 in conflict regressions. They 
find conflict increases
 dependence on resource extraction, rather than the other way 
around. 
 
c.  Institutions 
 
i.  Institutions, Governance, and Development 
 
A prominent trend in thinking regarding economic development is that the quality 
of institutions is the deep fundamental factor that determines which countries experience 
good performance and which do not, and that it is futile to recommend good 
macroeconomic or microeconomic policies if the institutional structure is not there to 
support them (e.g., Barro, 1991; North, 1994). Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) 
use as their measure of institutional quality an indicator of the rule of law and protection 
of property rights (taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 2002). Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) use a measure of expropriation risk to investors. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) measure the quality of a 
country’s “cluster of institutions” by the extent of constraints on the executive. The 
theory is that weak institutions lead to inequality, intermittent dictatorship, and lack of 
any constraints to prevent elites and politicians from plundering the country. 
Institutions can be endogenous: the result of economic growth rather than the 
cause.  (The same problem is encountered with other proposed fundamental determinants 
of growth, such as freedom from malaria and openness to trade.)   Many institutions -- 
such as the structure of financial markets, mechanisms of income redistribution and 
                                                 
13 The topic of energy export and conflict is discussed further in chapter ** of this 
volume. 
  13social safety nets, tax systems, and intellectual property rules -- tend to evolve 
endogenously, in response to the level of income.    
Econometricians address the problem of endogeneity by means of the technique 
of instrumental variables.  What is a good instrumental variable for institutions, an 
exogenous determinant? Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2002) and 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) introduce the mortality rates of colonial 
settlers. The theory is that, out of all the lands that Europeans colonized, only those where 
Europeans actually settled were given good European institutions. Acemoglu et al chose 
their instrument on the reasoning that initial settler mortality rates determined whether 
Europeans subsequently settled in large numbers.
14 The first item to point out to justify 
this otherwise idiosyncratic-sounding instrumental variable, is that there need not be a 
strong correlation between the diseases that killed settlers and the diseases that afflict 
natives, and that both are independent of the countries’ geographical suitability for trade. 
The conclusion of Rodrik et al is that institutions trump everything else -- the effects of 
both tropical geography and trade pale in the blinding light of institutions. Nobody denies 
the important role of macroeconomic stability; but the claim is that macroeconomic 
policies are merely the outcome of institutions.  
This is essentially the same result as found by Acemoglu et al (2002), Easterly 
and Levine (2002) and Hall and Jones (1999): institutions drives out the effect of 
policies, and geography matters primarily as a determinant of institutions.
15   It does not 
matter much whether the effect of institutions is merely one of several important deep 
factors or if, as these papers seem claim, it is the only important deep factor. Clearly, 
institutions are important.
16 
 
ii.  Oil, Institutions and Governance 
 
  Of the various possible channels through which natural resources could be a curse 
to long-run development, the quality of institutions and governance  is perhaps the most 
widely hypothesized.   Hodler (2006) and Caselli (2006) are among those finding a 
natural resource curse via internal struggle for ownership.   Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
find that natural resource dependence has a substantial statistical effect on measures of 
corruption in particular.    Gylfason and Zoega (2002) find a negative effect runnng via 
inequality.  Gylfason (2001) finds a negative effect via education.   
 
                                                 
14  Glaeser, et al, (2004)  argue against the settler variable.  Others, such as Hall and Jones 
(1999),  instead use other instruments for institutions, such as latitude. 
15 Easterly and Levine (2002) just group openness together with other policies.   Hall and 
Jones (1999) consider latitude a proxy for European institutions, and don’t distinguish the 
independent effect of tropical conditions. 
16 The imprecision of the word “institutions” can be frustrating (Frankel, 2003b).  Not all 
good institutions are necessarily equated with democracy.  Central bank independence is 
an example where the two conflict.   In the last section of this paper we consider 
examples of specific institutions that might lessen the Dutch Disease or Natural Resource 
Curse. 
  14It is not necessarily obvious, a priori, that endowments of oil should lead to 
inequality or authoritarianism or bad institutions generally.  As Humphreys, Sachs and 
Stiglitz (2007, p.2) point out, a government wishing to reduce inequality should in theory 
have an easier time of it in a country where much wealth comes from a non-renewable 
resource in fixed supply, because taxing it runs less risk of eliciting a fall in output.  This 
is in comparison to the more elastic supplies of manufactures and other goods or services, 
including agricultural goods, which are produced with a higher labor component.   But 
the usual interpretation is that most governments in resource-rich countries have 
historically not been interested in promoting equality. 
  
The “rent cycling theory” as enunciated by Auty (1990, 2001, 2007, 2009) holds 
that economic growth requires recycling rents via markets rather than via patronage.  In 
high-rent countries the natural resource elicits a political contest to capture ownership, 
whereas in low-rent countries the government must motivate people to create wealth, for 
example by pursuing comparative advantage, promoting equality, and fostering civil 
society.    This theory is related to the explanation of economic historians Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2002) as to why industrialization first took place in North America 
and not Latin America (and why in the Northeastern United States rather than the South).  
Lands endowed with extractive industries and plantation crops (mining, sugar, cotton) 
developed institutions of slavery, inequality, dictatorship, and state control, whereas those 
climates suited to fishing and small farms (fruits and vegetables, grain and livestock) 
developed institutions based on individualism, democracy, egalitarianism, and capitalism.   
When the industrial revolution came along, the latter areas were well-suited to make the 
most of it.  Those that had specialized in extractive industries were not, because society 
had come to depend on class structure and authoritarianism, rather than on individual 
incentive and decentralized decisionmaking.    The theory is thought to fit Middle Eastern 
oil exporters especially well.
17 
Isham, et al, (2005) find that the commodities that are damaging to institutional 
development, which they call “point source” resources, are, in addition to oil: other 
minerals, plantation crops, and coffee and cocoa (versus the same small-scale farm 
products identified by Engerman and Sokoloff).   Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
and Bulte, Damania, and Deacon ( 2005) also find that point-source resources such as oil 
and some particular minerals undermine institutional quality and thereby growth, but not 
agricultural resources.  Mehlum,  Moene, and Torvik (2006) observe the distinction by 
designating them “lootable” resources.    Arezki and Brückner (2009) find that oil rents 
worsen corruption (but, unusually, that they also improve civil liberties). 
Some have questioned the assumption that oil discoveries are exogenous and 
institutions endogenous, in other words the assumption that oil wealth is necessarily the 
cause and institutions the effect, rather than the other way around.   Norman (2009) 
points out that the discovery and development of oil is not purely exogenous, but rather is 
endogenous with respect to, among other things, the efficiency of the economy.   
Mehlum,  Moene, and Torvik (2006), Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006),  McSherry 
(2006) and Smith (2007) suggest that the important question is whether the country 
already has good institutions at the time that oil is discovered, in which case it is more 
                                                 
17  E.g., Iran.  Mahdavi (1970), Skocpol (1982, p. 269), and Smith (2007).  
  15likely to be put to use for the national welfare instead of the welfare of an elite.   But 
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) find no evidence that oil or mineral wealth interacts 
positively with institutional quality.
18 
 
d.  Oil and Democracy 
 
Mahdavy (1970) was apparently the first to suggest—followed by Luciani (1987), 
Vandewalle (1998) and many others -- that Middle Eastern governments’ access to rents, 
in the form of oil revenue, may have freed them from the need for taxation of their 
peoples, and that this in turn freed them from the need for democracy.   The need for tax 
revenue is believed to require democracy under the theory “no taxation without 
representation.”    Huntington (1991) generalized the principle beyond Middle Eastern oil 
producers to states with natural resources in other parts of the developing world. 
Statistical studies across large cross-sections of countries followed.  Ross (2001) 
finds that economic dependence on oil and mineral is correlated with authoritarian 
government.    So do Barro (2000), Wantchekon (2002), Jenson and Wantchekon (2004), 
and Ross (2006).  Smith (2004, 2007), Ulfelder (2007) and others generally find that 
authoritarian regimes have lasted longer in countries with oil wealth. 
But Karl (1997) points out that Venezuela had already been authoritarian when oil 
was developed, and in fact transitioned to democracy at the height of its oil wealth.   
None of the Central Asian states are democracies, even though Kazakhstan is the only 
one of them with major oil production.  Thus inspired, Haber and Menaldo (2009) look at 
historical time series data for a link to democracy from the share of oil or minerals in the 
economy and fail to find the statistically significant evidence that is typical of cross-
section and panel studies.
19   Similarly, when Dunning (2008) introduces fixed effects to 
take into account country-specific differences within Latin America, he finds that the 
correlation between oil profits and democracy turns positive.   
 
  The question whether oil dependence tends to retard democracy should probably 
not be regarded as a component of the causal relation between oil and economic 
performance.    Some correlates of democracy – rule of law, political stability, openness 
to international trade, initial equality of economic endowments and opportunities – do 
tend to be good for economic growth.  But each of these other variables can also exist 
without democracy.  Examples include pre-democratic Asian economies such as Korea or 
Taiwan.  Some believe that Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore and Augusto Pinochet in Chile 
could not have achieved their economic reforms without authoritarian powers (the one 
certainly more moderate and benevolent than the other).  On a bigger scale, it is said that 
China has grown so much faster than Russia since 1990 because Deng Xiao Peng chose 
                                                 
18 Before the interactive effects, they report significant negative effects of oil or mineral 
wealth on institutional quality when conditioning on actual initial income, but they 
disappear in their preferred equation, which does not condition on initial income.    
Institutional quality is measured by a standard rule of law index from the World Bank 
(and is instrumented by such variables as absolute latitude and fraction of the population 
speaking English or other major Western European languages). 
19 Loss of statistical power in pure cointegration time series tests might account for this. 
  16to pursue economic reform before political reform while Michel Gorbachev did it the 
other way around.   
The statistical evidence is at best mixed as to whether democracy per se is good 
for economic performance.   Barro (1996) finds that it is the rule of law, free markets, 
education, and small government consumption that are good for growth, not democracy 
per se.  Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find that it is education, not democracy per se. 
Alesina, et al, (1996) find that it is political stability.
20   Some even find that, after 
controlling for important factors such as the rule of law and political stability, democracy 
has if anything a weak negative effect on growth. 
One can claim good evidence for the reverse causation, that economic growth 
leads to democracy, often assisted by the creation of a middle class, much more reliably 
than the other way around.
21   Examples include Korea and Taiwan. 
  Of course democracy is often regarded as an end in itself, aside from whether it 
promotes economic growth.   Even here, one must note that the benefits of the formalities 
of elections can be over-emphasized.    For one thing, elections can be a sham.  Such 
leaders as Robert Mugabe, Hamid Karzai, and George W. Bush have each claimed to 
have been elected without having in fact earned a majority of their public’s votes.    
Western style or one-man one-vote elections should probably receive less priority in 
developing countries than the fundamental principles of rule of law, human rights, 
freedom of expression, economic freedom, minority rights, and some form of popular 
representation.
22  
 
 
 
IV.  The Dutch Disease and Procyclicality 
 
The Dutch Disease refers to some possibly unpleasant side effects of a boom in 
oil or other mineral and agricultural commodities.
23   
 
a.  The Macroeconomics of the Dutch Disease 
 
The phenomenon arises when a strong, but perhaps temporary, upward swing in the 
world price of the export commodity causes:  
                                                 
20  Collier and Hoeffler (2009) find that when developing countries have democracies, as 
opposed to advanced countries, they tend to feature weak checks and balances; as a 
result, when developing countries also have high natural resource rents the result is bad 
for economic growth. 
21 Helliwell (1994), Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1993), Lipset (1994) and Minier 
(1998). 
22  Zakaria (1997, 2004). 
23 Gregory (1976), Corden (1984) and Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) gave us three of 
the first models.  The name Dutch Disease [due to the Economist magazine] was 
originally inspired  by side-effects of natural gas discoveries by the Netherlands in the 
late 1950s;   Kremers (1986). 
  17•  a large real appreciation in the currency (taking the form of nominal currency 
appreciation if the country has a floating exchange rate or the form of money inflows 
and inflation if the country has a fixed exchange rate
24);  
•  an increase in spending (especially by the government, which for political economy 
reasons increases spending in response to the increased availability of tax receipts or 
royalties –discussed below); 
•  an increase in the price of nontraded goods (goods and services such as housing that 
are not internationally traded), relative to traded goods (internationally traded goods 
other than the export commodity),  
•  a resultant shift of labor and land out of non-export-commodity traded goods (pulled 
by the more attractive returns in the export commodity and in non-traded goods and 
services), and  
•  a current account deficit.     
 
When crowded-out non-commodity tradable goods are in the manufacturing sector, 
the feared effect is deindustrialization.   In a real model, the reallocation of resources 
across tradable sectors, e.g., from manufactures to oil, may be inevitable.  But the 
movement into non-traded goods is macroeconomic in origin.  What makes this a 
“disease?” One interpretation, particularly relevant if the complete cycle is not adequately 
foreseen, is that it is all painfully reversed when the world price of the export commodity 
goes back down.   A second interpretation is that, even if the perceived longevity of the 
increase in world price turns out to be accurate, that the crowding out of non-commodity 
exports is undesirable, perhaps because the manufacturing sector has greater externalities 
for long-run growth (as in Matsuyama, 1992).  But the latter view is really just another 
name for the Natural Resource Curse, discussed in the preceding section; it has nothing to 
do with cyclical fluctuations per se. 
 
The Dutch Disease can arise from sources other than a rise in the commodity price.  
Other examples arise from commodity booms due to the discovery of new deposits or 
some other expansion in supply, leading to a trade surplus via exports or a capital account 
surplus via inward investment to develop the new resource.   In addition, the term is also 
used by analogy for other sorts of inflows such as the receipt of transfers (foreign aid or 
remittances) or a stabilization-induced capital inflow.    In all cases, the result is real 
appreciation and a shift into nontradables, and away from (non-booming) tradables.    
Again, the real appreciation takes the form of a nominal appreciation if the exchange rate 
is flexible, and inflation if the exchange rate is fixed. 
 
                                                 
24 E.g., Edwards (1986).   During the boom of 2001-2008, examples of fixed-rate oil-
producing countries where the real appreciation came via money inflows and inflation 
include Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates.   Examples of floating-rate natural resource 
countries where the real appreciation took the form of nominal currency appreciation 
include Australia, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Russia, or South Africa.   (Chen 
and Rogoff, 2003, document the sensitivity of exchange rates to commodity prices in the 
cases of Australia and New Zealand.   Frankel, 2005b, documents Kazakhstan, and 
Frankel, 2007, South Africa).   
  18b.  Procyclicality 
 
Volatility in developing countries arises both from foreign shocks, such as the 
fluctuations in the price of the export commodity discussed above, and also from 
domestic macroeconomic and political instability. Although most developing countries in 
the 1990s brought under control the chronic runaway budget deficits, money creation, 
and inflation, that they experienced in the preceding two decades, most are still subject to 
monetary and fiscal policy that is procyclical rather than countercyclical: they tend to be 
expansionary in booms and contractionary in recessions, thus exacerbating the 
magnitudes of the swings.  (The aim should be to moderate them -- the countercyclical 
pattern that the models and textbooks of the decades following the Great Depression 
originally hoped discretionary policy would take).    Often income inequality and populist 
political economy are deep fundamental forces underlying the procyclicality. 
 
That developing countries tend to experience larger cyclical fluctuations than 
industrialized countries is only partly attributable to commodities.   It is also in part due 
to the role of factors that “should” moderate the cycle, but in practice seldom operate that 
way: procyclical capital flows, procyclical monetary and fiscal policy, and the related 
Dutch Disease.  If anything, they tend to exacerbate booms and busts instead of 
moderating them.  The hope that improved policies or institutions might reduce this 
procyclicality makes this one of the most potentially fruitful avenues of research in 
emerging market macroeconomics. 
 
c.  The procyclicality of capital flows to developing countries 
 
According to the theory of intertemporal optimization, countries should borrow 
during temporary downturns, to sustain consumption and investment, and should repay or 
accumulate net foreign assets during temporary upturns.  In practice, it does not tend to 
work this way.  Capital flows are more often procyclical than countercyclical.
25   Most 
theories to explain this involve imperfections in capital markets, such as asymmetric 
information or the need for collateral.    
  As developing countries evolve more market-oriented financial systems, the 
capital inflows during the boom phase show up increasingly in prices for land and 
buildings, and also in prices of financial assets.    Prices of equities and bonds (or the 
reciprocal, the interest rate) are summary measures of the extent of speculative 
enthusiasm, often useful for predicting which countries are vulnerable to crises in the 
future.
26     
In the commodity and emerging market boom of 2003-2008, net capital flows 
typically went to countries with current account surpluses, especially Asians and 
                                                 
25   Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005); Reinhart and Reinhart (2009); Gavin, 
Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996); and Mendoza and Terrones(2008). 
26  Rose and Spiegel (2009) find that equity prices are the one robust predictor of which 
emerging markets got into trouble in the 2008 global financial crisis. 
  19commodity producers in the Middle East and Latin America, where they showed up in 
record accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.   This is in contrast to the two 
previous cycles, 1975-1981 and 1990-97, where the capital flows to developing countries 
mainly went to finance current account deficits. 
One interpretation of procyclical capital flows is that they result from procyclical 
fiscal policy:  when governments increase spending in booms, some of the deficit is 
financed by borrowing from abroad.   When they are forced to cut spending in 
downturns, it is to repay some of the excessive debt that they incurred during the upturn.     
Another interpretation of procyclical capital flows to developing countries is that they 
pertain especially to exporters of agricultural and mineral commodities, particularly oil.    
We consider procyclical fiscal policy in the next sub-section, and the commodity cycle 
(Dutch disease) in the one after. 
 
d.  The procyclicality of fiscal policy 
 
Many authors have documented that fiscal policy tends to be procyclical in 
developing countries, especially in comparison with industrialized countries.
 27    Most 
studies look at the procyclicality of government spending, because tax receipts are 
particularly endogenous with respect to the business cycle.   An important reason for 
procyclical spending is precisely that government receipts from taxes or royalties rise in 
booms, and the government cannot resist the temptation or political pressure to increase 
spending proportionately, or more than proportionately. 
Procyclicality is especially pronounced in countries that possess natural resources 
and where income from those resources tends to dominate the business cycle.   Among 
those focusing on the correlation between commodity booms and spending booms is 
Cuddington (1989).  Sinnott (2009) finds that Latin American countries are sufficiently 
commodity-dependent that government revenue responds significantly to commodity 
prices. Spending also responds positively in the case of hydrocarbon producers.
28 
Two large budget items that account for much of the increased spending from oil 
booms are investment projects and the government wage bill.    Regarding the first 
budget item, investment in infrastructure can have large long-term pay-off if it is well 
designed
29;  too often in practice, however, it takes the form of white elephant projects, 
which are stranded without funds for completion or maintenance, when the oil price goes 
back down (Gelb, 1986).   Regarding the second budget item, Medas and Zakharova 
(2009) point out that oil windfalls have often been spent on higher public sector wages.   
They can also go to increasing the number of workers employed by the government.   
Either way, they raise the total public sector wage bill, which is hard to reverse when oil 
prices go back down.   Figures 2 and 3 plot the public sector wage bill against primary 
                                                 
27    Cuddington (1989), Lane and Tornell (1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), 
Talvi and Végh  (2005), Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), Mendoza and Oviedo 
(2006), Ilzetski and Vegh (2008) and Medas and Zakharova  (2009).     For Latin 
America in particular: Gavin and Perotti (1997). 
28 Especially Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela (Figure 4).  She does not find that the 
spending relationshiop is statistically significant, but this may be due to insufficient data. 
29 Delong and Summers (1991). 
  20product prices for two oil producers over the preceding three years:  Iran and Indonesia.     
There is a clear positive relationship.  That the relationship is strong with a three-year lag 
illustrates the problem:  oil prices may have fallen over three years, but public sector 
wages cannot easily be cut nor workers laid off.
30 
 
                                                 
30 Source for graphs: Frankel (2005b). 
  21 
Figure 2:    Iran’s Government Wage Bill Is Influenced by Oil Prices Over Preceding 3 
Years    (1974, 1977-1997.) 
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Fig. 3:  Indonesia’s Government Wage Bill Is Influenced by Oil Prices Over Preceding 3 
Years (1974, 1977-79)      
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V.  Policy Solutions 
 
A wide variety of measures have been proposed, and some adopted, to cope with 
the commodity cycle.
31   Some work better than others. 
 
a.  Institutions That Were Supposed to Stabilize But Have Not Worked 
 
A number of institutions have been implemented in the name of reducing the 
impact on producer countries of volatility in world commodity markets.  Most have failed 
to do so, and many have had detrimental effects. 
 
i.  Marketing boards 
 
Examples of marketing boards are the systems implemented around the time of 
independence in some East and West African countries, requiring that all sales of cocoa 
and coffee pass through the government agency.   The original justification was to 
stabilize the price to domestic producers, symmetrically setting a price above world 
prices when the latter were low and setting a domestic price below world prices when the 
latter were high.  That in turn would have required symmetrically adding to government 
stockpiles when world prices were low, and running them down when world prices were 
low.     
In practice, the price paid to (politically weak) cocoa and coffee farmers was 
always below the world price.  The rationale eventually shifted from stabilization to 
taxation of the agricultural sector (which was thought to be inelastic in its supply 
behavior), and subsidization of the industrial sector.    But industrialization did not 
happen.  Rather, the agricultural sector shrank.   Commodity marketing boards were a 
failure. 
 
ii.  Other government stockpiles 
 
Some governments maintain stockpiles, in particular under national security 
rationales, such as American’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve.  One drawback is that 
decisions regarding the management of government stockpiles are often made subject to 
political pressure, rather than to maximize the objective of insulating against the biggest 
shocks.  Another drawback is undermining of the incentive for private citizens to hold 
stockpiles. 
 In some countries where prices of fuel to consumers are a politically sensitive 
issue, the incentive for the private sector to maintain inventories is undercut in any case, 
by the knowledge that in the event of a big increase in the price of the commodity, the 
inventory-holder will probably not be allowed to reap the benefits.    If this political 
economy structure is a given, then there is a valid argument for the government to do the 
stockpiling. 
 
                                                 
31 E.g., Davis, et al (2003) and Sachs (2007). 
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iii.  Producer subsidies 
 
More often in rich countries, the primary producing sector has political power on 
its side.   Then the stockpiles act as a subsidy rather than a tax.   An example is the 
Common Agricultural Policy in Europe.  Subsidies also go to coal miners in Germany, oil 
companies with cheap leases on federal lands in the United States, and agricultural and 
energy sectors in many other countries. 
 
iv.  Price controls for consumers 
 
In developing countries, the political forces often seek to shield consumers against 
increases in prices of basic food and energy through price controls.  If the country is a 
producer of the crop or mineral in question, then the policy tool to insulate domestic 
consumers against increases in the world price is export controls.      (Examples include 
Argentina’s wheat and India’s rice in 2008.)  Meanwhile, if the country is an importer of 
the crop or mineral in question, then either the commodity is rationed to domestic 
households or else the excess demand at the below-market domestic price is made up by 
imports.    Capped exports from the exporting countries and price controls in the 
importing countries both work to exacerbate the magnitude of the upswing of the price 
for the (artificially reduced) quantity that is still internationally traded.   If the producing 
and consuming countries in the rice market could cooperatively agree to refrain from 
government intervention, volatility would probably be lower, not higher. 
 
v.  OPEC and other International cartels   
 
In a world of multiple producers for each agricultural and mineral product, efforts 
by producing countries to raise the price or reduce the volatility would logically require 
the cooperation of all or most of the producers.   Most attempts at forming international 
cartels have failed within a few years.     
The institution that endures decade after decade is OPEC.  It is not clear whether 
its attempts to raise the average or reduce the variability of the price have succeeded.   
Some of the most abrupt decreases as well as increases in the world price over the last 
half century have arguably been attributable to changes in OPEC’s internal dynamics 
(increased collusion after the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, followed by a breakdown in the 
1980s when members stopped obeying their agreed quotas).  Meanwhile, many new oil 
producers have cropped up outside of OPEC, suggesting a diminution in its collective 
monopoly power even when it is acting in unison. 
 
b.  Devices to share risks 
 
It is probably best to accept that commodity prices will be volatile, and to seek to 
establish institutions that will limit adverse economic effects that result from it.   In this 
section we consider microeconomic policies to minimize exposure to risk, the sort of 
short–term volatility discussed in part II of the paper.  (We will subsequently consider 
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associated with the Dutch Disease.)    
 
Three devices for avoiding exposure to short-term volatility are promising.   One 
is relevant for energy exporters who sign contracts with foreign companies, another for 
producers that do their own selling, and a third for governments dependent on energy 
revenues. 
 
i.  Price setting in contracts with foreign companies 
 
Price setting in contracts between energy producers and foreign companies is 
often plagued by a problem that is known to theorists as dynamic inconsistency.
32   The 
pattern has been repeated in many countries.  A price is set by contract.  Later the world 
price goes up, and then the government wants to renege. It doesn't want to give the 
company all the profits and, in a sense, why should it?  Certainly the political pressures 
are typically strong.   
But it is a “repeated game.”   The risk that the locals will renege makes foreign 
companies reluctant to do business in the first place.  It limits the amount of capital 
available to the country, and probably raises the price of that capital.  The process of 
renegotiation can have large transactions costs, such as interruptions in the export flow. 
It has become such a familiar pattern that it seems more contracts ought to have 
been designed to be robust with respect to this inconsistency, by making the terms 
explicitly dependent on future market conditions.
33  The simplest device would be 
indexed contracts, where the two parties agree ahead of time, “if the world price goes up 
ten per cent, then the gains are split between the company and the government” in some 
particular proportion.   Indexation shares the risks of gains and losses, without the costs 
of renegotiation or the damage to a country’s reputation from reneging on a contract. 
 
 
ii.  Hedging in commodity futures markets 
 
Producers, whether private or public, often sell their commodities on international 
spot markets.  They are thus exposed to the risk that the dollar price of a given export 
quantity will rise or fall.   In many cases, the producer can hedge the risk by selling that 
quantity on the forward or futures market.  As with indexation of the contract price, 
hedging means that there is no need for costly renegotiation in the event of large changes 
in the world price.  The adjustment happens automatically.  Mexico, for example, has 
hedged its oil revenues in this way.
34  One possible drawback, especially if it is a 
government ministry doing the hedging, is that the minister may receive little credit for 
having saved the country from disaster when the world price plummets, but will be 
excoriated for having sold out the national patrimony when the world price rises. 
                                                 
32  Helm (2010). 
33   Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz  (2007, p. 323). 
34   E.g., “Mexico Buys $1bn Insurance Policy Against Falling Oil Prices,” Financial 
Times, Dec. 9, 2009. 
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iii.  Denomination of debt in terms of commodity prices 
 
An excellent idea, which has unaccountably never managed to catch on, is for a 
mineral-producing company or government to index its debt to the price of the 
commodity.   Debt service obligations automatically rise and fall with the commodity 
price.  This would save developing countries from the kinds of crises that Latin 
Americans faced in 1982 and Asians in 1997, when the dollar prices of their exports fell 
at the same time that the dollar interest rate on their debts went up.   The result for many 
countries was an abrupt deterioration of their debt service ratios and a balance of 
payments crisis.  This would not have happened if their debts had been indexed to their 
commodity prices – oil for such borrowers as Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, 
and Russia.   As with contract indexation and hedging, the adjustment in the event of 
fluctuations in the world price is automatic. 
  When officials in commodity producing countries are asked why they haven’t 
tried indexing their bonds (or loans) to the price of their export commodity, the usual 
answer is that they don’t think there would be enough demand (or enough interest from 
banks).   It is true that a market needs a certain level of liquidity in order to thrive, and 
that it can be hard for a new financial innovation to get over the volume threshold.  But it 
used to be said that foreigners wouldn’t buy bonds denominated in the currencies of 
emerging market countries.
35   Yet in recent years, more and more developing countries 
have found that they could borrow in their own currency if they tried.   Investor 
receptivity to oil-denominated bonds is potentially larger.    There are obvious natural 
ultimate customers for oil-linked bonds:  electric utilities and the many other companies 
in industrialized countries who are as adversely affected by an increase in the world price 
of oil as the oil exporters are by a decrease. 
 
c.  Monetary policy 
 
We now move from ideas for institutions to address the risk created by high short-
term price volatility to ideas for macroeconomic management of medium-term swings.   
We begin with monetary and exchange rate policy to manage the Dutch Disease. 
 
i.  Fixed vs. floating exchange rates 
 
Fixed and floating exchange rates each have their advantages.   The main 
advantages of a fixed exchange rate are, first, that it reduces the costs of international 
trade, and second that it is a nominal anchor for monetary policy, helping the central bank 
achieve low-inflation credibility.  The main advantage of floating, for a commodity 
producer, is that it often provides automatic accommodation of terms of trade shocks:  
during a commodity boom, the currency tends to appreciate, thereby moderating what 
                                                 
35  Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) said that the “original sin” plaguing emerging 
markets was the reluctance of foreign investors to expose themselves in local currency. 
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and the reverse during a commodity bust. 
A reasonable balancing of these pros and cons, appropriate for many middle-size 
middle-income countries, is an intermediate exchange rate regime such as managed 
floating or a target zone (a band).   The mid-point of the band can be defined as a basket 
of major currencies, rather than a simple bilateral parity against the dollar or euro, if 
neither the United States nor euroland is the dominant trading partner currency.   In the 
booming decade that began in 2001, many followed the intermediate regime, in between 
a few commodity producers in the floating corner (Chile and Mexico) and a few in the 
firmly fixed corner (Gulf oil producers, Ecuador).   While they officially declared 
themselves as floating (often as part of Inflation Targeting), in practice they intervened 
heavily, taking perhaps  half the increase in demand for their currency in the form of 
appreciation but half in the form of increased foreign exchange reserves.
36     Particularly 
at the early stages of a commodity boom, when one has little idea whether it is permanent 
or not, there is a good case for intervention in the foreign exchange market, adding to 
reserves (especially if the alternative is abandoning an established successful exchange 
rate target), and perhaps for awhile attempting to sterilize the inflow to prevent rapid 
expansion in the money supply.   In subsequent years, if the increase in world commodity 
prices looks to be long-lived, there is a stronger case for accommodating it through 
nominal and real appreciation of the currency. 
It is especially important in developing countries, where institutions tend to have 
lower credibility than in advanced countries, that the public’s expectations of inflation be 
anchored by some nominal target by which the central bank asks to be judged.  If the 
exchange rate is not to be the nominal target, then some other anchor variable should be 
chosen. 
 
ii.  Alternative nominal anchors 
 
Three candidates for nominal anchor have had ardent supporters in the past, but 
are no longer prominently in the running.   They are: the price of gold, as under the 19
th 
century gold standard; the money supply, the choice of monetarists; and National Income, 
the choice of many mainstream economists in the 1980s. 
  Central bankers and monetary economists alike have, in recent years, considered 
Inflation Targeting to be the preferred approach -- or at least the preferred alternative to 
fixed exchange rates, which may be appropriate for very small very open countries.   
Although there are different interpretations of Inflation Targeting, some more flexible 
than others, they all tend to take the CPI as the index to be targeted, and to explicitly 
disavow the exchange rate as a target (or domestic commodity prices, or asset prices).
37 
                                                 
36  Examples among commodity-producers include Kazakhstan, South Africa, Russia, 
and many others.  The tendency for official floaters to intervene heavily in practice to 
dampen exchange rate fluctuations was named “fear of floating,” by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002). 
37  Two qualifications to the apotheosis of the CPI.  First, some versions phrase targets in 
terms of “headline CPI” and some in terms of  “core CPI,” typically excluding food and 
energy.   Second, proponents often say that it is alright for the central bank to pay 
  27  Inflation Targeting (IT) has a particular disadvantage for commodity producing 
countries: it is not robust with respect to changes in the terms of trade.   Consider a fall in 
world market conditions for the export commodity, a decrease in the dollar price.   It has 
a negative impact on both the balance of payments and the level of economic activity.  It 
would be desirable for monetary policy to loosen and the currency to depreciate, to boost 
net foreign demand and thereby restore external balance and internal balance.   But CPI 
targeting tells the central bank to keep monetary policy sufficiently tight that the currency 
does not depreciate, because otherwise import prices will rise and push the CPI above its 
target.    Conversely if the world price for the export commodity goes up, a CPI target 
prevents a needed appreciation of the currency because it would lower import prices and 
push the CPI below its target. 
  I have in the past proposed for commodity producers a regime that I call Peg the 
Export Price (PEP).   The proposal is that monetary policy be guided by the rule to keep 
the local-currency price of the export commodity stable from day to day.   For an oil-
producer, every day that the dollar price of oil goes up 1%, monetary policy would allow 
the dollar price of the local currency to go up 1%, thereby keeping the local price of oil 
unchanged.  The argument is that PEP combines the best of both worlds:  it automatically 
accommodates terms of trade changes, as floating is supposed to do, while 
simultaneously abiding by a pre-announced nominal anchor, as IT is supposed to do.   
Simulations show, for example, that if Indonesia and Russia had been on a PEP regime, 
they would have automatically experienced necessary depreciation in the late 1990s, 
when oil prices fell, without having to go through the painful currency crises that these 
two countries in fact experienced in 1998.
38    An additional selling point is that because 
PEP moderates swings in the real value of export revenue, expressed in terms of 
purchasing power over domestic goods and services, it would reduce the tendency for 
governments to increase spending excessively in boom times and symmetrically cut it in 
busts. 
  PEP in its pure form is a rather extreme proposal.   If the non-commodity export 
sector is not small, or if policy-makers want it to become larger, then PEP has the 
disadvantage of fully transferring the burden of exogenous fluctuations in world 
commodity prices to variability in domestic prices of non-commodity exports.  It is not 
clear that this is an improvement over continuing to let the fluctuations show up as 
variability in domestic prices of the commodity export.   A more practical version of the 
proposal would be to target a more comprehensive index of export prices rather than a 
single export price (Peg the Export Price Index).
39    A still more moderate version would 
target an even more comprehensive index of domestic production prices, including 
                                                                                                                                                 
attention to the exchange rate (or commodity prices or asset prices), but only to the extent 
that it helps achieve its longer run objective of price stability.    Neither of these two 
qualifications matters for present purposes. 
38 Frankel (2003a).   A more practical variation, for a country already contemplating a 
basket peg, is to include the commodity in the basket.   Middle Eastern oil exporters, for 
example, could have a basket peg with 1/3 weight on the dollar, 1/3 on the euro, and 1/3 
on a barrel of oil.  (Frankel, “A Crude Proposal to Peg the Dinar,” Financial Times, June 
13, 2003.) 
39  Frankel (2005a, 2008c). 
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40  The important 
point is to include export commodities in the index and exclude import commodities, 
whereas the CPI does it the other way around. 
 
 
d.  Institutions to make national saving procyclical 
 
Some of the most important ways to cope with the commodity cycle are 
institutions to insure that export earnings are put aside during the boom time, into a 
commodity saving fund, perhaps with the aid of rules governing the cyclically adjusted 
budget surplus.
41   
 
i.  Rules for the budget deficit: The Example of Chile. 
 
  As of June 2008, the President of Chile, Michele Bachelet, and her Finance 
Minister, Andres Velasco, had the lowest approval ratings of any President or Finance 
Minister, respectively, since the return of democracy. There were undoubtedly multiple 
reasons for this, but one was popular resentment that the two had resisted intense pressure 
to spend the soaring receipts from copper exports.  One year later, in the summer of 2009, 
the pair had the highest approval ratings of any President and Finance Minister.  Why the 
change?   Not an improvement in overall economic circumstances:  in the meantime the 
global recession had hit.  Copper prices had fallen abruptly.  But the government had 
increased spending sharply, using the assets that it had acquired during the copper boom, 
and thereby moderating the downturn.  Saving for a rainy day made the officials heroes, 
now that the rainy day had come.  Chile has achieved what few commodity-producing 
developing countries have achieved:  a truly countercyclical fiscal policy.  Some credit 
should go to previous governments, who initiated an innovative fiscal institution.
42     But 
much credit should go to the Bachelet government, who enshrined the general framework 
in law and abided by it when it was most difficult to do so politically.  It introduced a 
Fiscal Responsibility Bill in 2006, which gave legal force to the role of the structural 
budget.
43   
            Chile’s fiscal policy is governed by a set of rules.   The first one is a target for the 
overall budget surplus -- originally set at 1 % of GDP, then lowered to ½ % of GDP, and 
again to 0 in 2009.    This may sound like the budget deficit ceilings that supposedly 
constrain members of euroland (deficits of 3 % of GDP under the Stability and Growth 
Pact) or like the occasional U.S. proposals for a Balanced Budget Amendment (zero 
deficit).    But those attempts have failed, because they are too rigid to allow the need for 
deficits in recessions, counterbalanced by surpluses in good times.  The alternative of 
                                                 
40  Frankel (2009). 
41  Davis et al (2001a,b, 2003).    
42 Page 11 of International Monetary Fund, Chile 2005 Article IV Consultation, IMF 
Country Report 05/013 (September 2005). 
43  The bill also created a Pension Reserve Fund and a Social and Economic Stabilization 
Fund, the latter a replacement for the existing Copper Stabilization Funds. 
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than expected also does not work, because it imposes no discipline.  
            Under the Chilean rules, the government can run a deficit larger than the target to 
the extent that: 
(1) output falls short of potential, in a recession, or 
(2) the price of copper is below its medium-term (10-year) equilibrium, 
with the key institutional innovation that there are two panels of experts whose job it is 
each mid-year to make the judgments, respectively, what is the output gap and what is the 
medium term equilibrium price of copper (also the same for molybdenum).   Thus in the 
copper boom of 2003-2008 when, as usual, the political pressure was to declare the 
increase in the price of copper permanent thereby justifying spending on a par with 
export earnings, the expert panel ruled that most of the price increase was temporary so 
that most of the earnings had to be saved.  This turned out to be right, as the 2008 spike 
was indeed temporary.    As a result, the fiscal surplus reached almost 9 % when copper 
prices were high.  The country paid down its debt to a mere 4 % of GDP and it saved 
about 12 % of GDP in the sovereign wealth fund.    This allowed a substantial fiscal 
easing in the recession of 2008-09, when the stimulus was most sorely needed. 
  Any country, but especially commodity-producers, could usefully apply variants 
of the Chilean fiscal device.  (Ecuador has a similar rule for its oil revenues.)  Given that 
many developing countries are more prone to weak institutions, a useful reinforcement of 
the Chilean idea would be to formalize the details of the procedure into law and give the 
members of the panels legal independence.  There could a requirement regarding the 
professional qualifications of the members and laws protecting them from being fired, as 
there are for governors of independent central banks.  The principle of a separation of 
decision-making powers should be retained:  the rules as interpreted by the panels 
determine the total amount of spending or budget deficits, while the elected political 
leaders determine how that total is allocated. 
 
ii.  Commodity Funds or Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
  Many natural resource producers have Commodity Funds, to invest savings for 
future welfare, often in global portfolios.  The oldest and biggest Commodity Funds are 
in the Persian Gulf, belonging to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.   Some highly 
successful non-commodity exporters in Asia have established such funds too.  When 
China joined the club in 2007, they received a new name, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and a 
lot of new examination. 
  It has been pointed out that the mere creation of a commodity fund, in itself, does 
not necessarily do anything to insure that politicians will not raid the fund when it is 
flush.
44   Two standard recommendations are that the funds be transparently and 
professionally run, and that they be given clear instructions that politics should not 
interfere with their objective of maximizing the financial wellbeing of the country.   The 
Norwegian State Petroleum Fund (now called the Norwegian Pension Fund) is often held 
                                                 
44  Davis et al (2001b) and Humphreys and Sandhu (2007).   In countries with few checks 
and balances, large yearly changes in oil revenues tend to lead to large yearly changes in 
government consumption. 
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makers can do, and the fund is managed with political objectives that go unnoticed when 
held up as an example for developing countries to emulate.
45    Better to have rules 
dictating the cap on spending out of the fund.     The commodity fund of Sao Tome and 
Principe, on the other hand, newly established in 2004, includes extensive restrictions 
guiding how the oil revenues are to be saved, invested, or spent.  (Outflows legally 
cannot exceed the highest amount that could be sustained in perpetuity.) 
  Humphreys and Sandhu (2007) recommend that spending go through the regular 
budget, so that they do not become any politicians’ private “slush funds.”  There can be 
advantages in earmarking the commodity funds for specific good causes such as 
education, health, or retirement support for a future generation.    If the political 
constituents know how the money is to be spent, they may be both more tolerant of the 
initiative to save it in the first place and more vigilant with respect to transgressions by 
politicians wishing to raid the kitty to spend on armies or palaces. 
 
iii.  Reserve accumulation by central banks  
 
One way that countries save in the aggregate during booms, in order to be able to 
dissave in busts, is for central banks to accumulate international reserves via foreign 
exchange intervention.  Economists have regarded this as a sub-optimal mechanism: if 
the goal is smoothing spending over time, as opposed to stabilization of the exchange 
rate, holding the assets in the form of foreign exchange reserves has disadvantages.  First, 
the reserves (typically US treasury bills) do not earn a high return.  Second, increases in 
reserves can lead to rapid monetary expansion (if not sterilized) and thereby to inflation.    
Thus a central bank that already has enough reserves, judged by precautionary and 
monetary criteria, should consider selling some of the foreign exchange to the country’s 
Natural Resource Fund.    But if the Central Bank has political independence and the 
NRF does not, that may be a reason to leave the reserves where they cannot be raided. 
 
iv.  Reducing net private capital inflows during booms 
 
  If foreign exchange reserves are piling up to excessive levels, there are other ways 
to reduce the balance of payments surplus and facilitate national saving.  One is for the 
government deliberately to pay down debt, especially short-term debt.   Another is to 
remove any remaining controls on the ability of domestic citizens to invest abroad.  A 
third is to place controls on capital inflows, especially short-term inflows. 
 
v.  Lump sum distribution    
 
                                                 
45  The political objectives are thought of as social responsibility, but include, for 
example, boycotting stock in Wal-Mart (a company that most American economists 
consider beneficial to people of lower income).   “Norway Proposes to Do Well in Its 
Investments by Doing Good,” New York Times, May 4, 2007, p. C4; “Norway Finds 
Virtue (and Value) in Transparency,” New York Times, Sept. 27, 2008., p.B2. 
  31  The Alaska Permanent Fund saves earnings from the state’s oil sector.  Alaska 
state law says that the Fund must distribute half of the investment earnings on an equal 
per capita basis.   The theory is that the citizens know how to spend their money better 
than does their government.   Certainly the system gives Alaskans a good reason to feel 
that they are full stakeholders in the Fund.    Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
suggest that Nigeria should similarly distribute its oil earnings on a equal per capita basis;  
Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) make the same proposal for Iraq.
46 
 
e.  Efforts to impose external checks 
 
  All these institutions can fail if, as in some countries, the executive simply ignores 
the law and spends what he wants.   In 2000 the World Bank agreed to help Chad, a new 
oil producer, to finance a new pipeline.  The agreement stipulated that Chad would spend 
72 per cent of its oil export earnings on poverty reduction (particularly health, education 
and road-building) and put aside 10 percent in a “future generations fund.”   ExxonMobil 
was to deposit the oil revenues in an escrow account at Citibank and the government was 
to spend them subject to oversight by an independent committee.   But once the money 
started rolling in, the government (ranked by Transparency International as one of the 
two most corrupt in the world) reneged on the agreement.
47 
 Evidently  International  Financial Institutions would have to go beyond the Chad 
model if local rulers are to be prevented from abuse.   The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, launched in 2002, includes the principle “Publish What You 
Pay,” under which international oil companies commit to make known how much they 
pay governments for oil, so that the public at least has a way of knowing when large sums 
disappear.  Legal mechanisms adopted by Sao Tome and Principe void contracts if 
information relating to oil revenues is not made public.  Further proposals would give 
extra powers to a global clearing house or foreign bank where the Natural Resource Fund 
is located, such as freezing accounts in the event of a coup.
48   Perhaps that principle 
could be generalized:  it may be that well-intentioned politicians spend oil wealth quickly 
out of fear that their successors will misspend whatever is left, in which case the adoption 
of an external mechanism that constrains spending both in the present in the future may 
not be an unacceptable violation of sovereignty. 
 
 
                                                 
46  Ross (2007). 
47  “Chad Backs Out of Pledge to use Oil Wealth to Reduce Poverty,” New York Times, 
Dec. 13, 2005, p. A15;   “World Bank Suspends Loans to Chad Over Use of Oil Money,” 
NYT, Jan. 7, 2006; “The ‘Resource Curse’ Anew: Way a Grand World Bank Oil Project 
Has Fast Run Into the Sand,” Financial Times, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 13;  “World Bank Ends 
Effort to Help Chad Ease Poverty,” New York Times, September 11, 2008; “Breaking the 
Bank: A Vaunted Model Development Project Goes Awry,” The Economist, Sept. 26, 
2008, p. 63. 
48 Humphreys and Sandhu (2007, p. 224-227).   During the period when Kuwait was 
occupied by an Iraqi invasion, access to Kuwaiti bank accounts in London stayed with 
the Kuwaitis.    
  32VII.  Summary 
 
  Much theoretical reasoning and statistical evidence suggests that possession of 
natural resources such as hydrocarbons, minerals, and perhaps agricultural endowments, 
can confer negative effects on a country, along with the benefits.  This paper has 
considered six channels whereby natural resources might possibly have negative effects 
on economic performance.    The first, the Prebisch hypothesis of a negative long-term 
trend in commodity prices is counteracted by theoretical arguments for a positive trend, 
and empirical findings that there is no consistent trend either way.  But the other five 
channels each have at least some truth to them.   
  (1) Commodity price volatility is high, which imposes risk and transactions costs.  
(2) Specialization in natural resources can be detrimental to growth if it crowds out the 
manufacturing sector that is the locus of positive externalities.    (3) Mineral riches can 
lead to civil war, which is certainly an obstacle to development.   (4) Endowments of 
“point source” commodities (oil and minerals and some crops) can lead to poor 
institutions, such as corruption, inequality, class structure, chronic power struggles, and 
absence of rule of law and property rights.    Natural resource wealth can also inhibit the 
development of democracy, though there is not good evidence that democracy per se (as 
opposed to openness, economic freedom, decentralization of decision-making, and 
political stability) leads to economic growth.  (5) The Dutch Disease, resulting from a 
commodity boom, entails real appreciation of the currency and increased government 
spending, both of which expand nontraded goods and service sectors such as housing and 
render uncompetitive non-commodity export sectors such as manufactures.  If and when 
world commodity prices go back down, adjustment is difficult due to the legacy of 
bloated government spending and debt and a shrunken manufacturing sector.  
 
  In recent years, a host of revisionists have questioned each of these five channels, 
as well as the bottom line that natural resource wealth is detrimental for economic 
growth.  Some differences in econometric findings are attributable to whether economic 
performance is measured as the level of income or the rate of growth of income during 
the sample period.   Others are due to whether the equation conditions on related 
variables when it tests the influence of the channel in question. 
From a policy viewpoint, we don’t necessarily need to settle these questions.   It is 
clear that some resource-rich countries do surprisingly poorly economically, while others 
do well.   We have noted examples of both sorts: countries such as Norway, Botswana 
and Chile that have done very well with their endowments (oil, diamonds and copper, 
respectively) versus others such as Nigeria, Bolivia and Congo that have done poorly.  
The Natural Resource Curse should not be interpreted as a rule that resource-rich 
countries are doomed to failure.      The question is what policies to adopt to increase the 
chances of prospering.   It is safe to say that destruction or renunciation of resource 
endowments, to avoid dangers such as the corruption of leaders, will not be one of these 
policies.  Even if such a drastic action would on average leave the country better off, 
which seems unlikely, who would be the policy-maker to whom one would deliver such 
advice? 
 
  33  The paper concludes with a list of ideas for institutions designed to address 
aspects of the resource curse and thereby increase the chance of economic success.   
Some of the ideas on the list that most merit consideration by countries rich in oil or other 
natural resources are as follows.   
1.  Include in contracts with foreign purchasers clauses for automatic 
adjustment of the price if world market conditions change. 
2.  Hedge export proceeds in commodity futures markets. 
3.  Denominate debt in terms of commodity prices. 
4.  Allow some nominal currency appreciation in response to an increase in 
world prices of the commodity, but also add to foreign exchange reserves, 
especially at the early stages of the boom when it may prove to be 
transitory. 
5.  If the monetary regime is to be Inflation Targeting, consider using as the 
target, in place of the standard CPI, a price measure that puts greater 
weight on the export commodity, such as an index of export prices or 
producer prices. 
6.  Emulate Chile: to avoid excessive spending in boom times, allow 
deviations from a target surplus only in response to output gaps and long-
lasting commodity price increases, as judged by independent panels of 
experts rather than politicians. 
7.  Commodity Funds should be transparently and professionally run, with 
rules to govern the payout rate and with insulation of the managers from 
political pressure in their pursuit of the financial wellbeing of the country.    
8.  When spending oil wealth, consider lump-sum distribution on an equal per 
capita basis. 
9.  An external agent, for example a financial institution that houses the 
Commodity Fund, could be mandated to provide transparency and to 
freeze accounts in the event of a coup. 
 
Needless to say, policies and institutions have to be tailored to local circumstances, 
country by country.   But with good intentions and innovative thinking, there is no reason 
why resource-rich countries need fall prey to the curse. 
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